

119TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**S.** \_\_\_\_\_

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

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Mr. COONS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

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**A BILL**

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Defending Inter-  
5       national Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships  
6       and Tactics Act” or “DISRUPT Act”.

1   **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2       Congress makes the following findings:

3           (1) The People’s Republic of China, the Rus-  
4       sian Federation, Iran, and the Democratic People’s  
5       Republic of Korea are each considered—

6           (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in sec-  
7       tion 825(d) of the National Defense Authoriza-  
8       tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law  
9       118–31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309  
10      note));

11          (B) a country of risk (as defined in section  
12      6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life  
13      Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-  
14      tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law  
15      118–159; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b  
16      note)) for purposes of assessing counterintel-  
17      ligence risks posed by certain visitors to Na-  
18      tional Laboratories;

19          (C) a foreign country of concern (as de-  
20      fined in section 10612(a) of the Research and  
21      Development, Competition, and Innovation Act  
22      (Public Law 117–167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42  
23      U.S.C. 19221 note));

24          (D) a covered foreign country (as defined  
25      in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of  
26      Life Improvement and National Defense Au-

1           thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public  
2           Law 118–159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651  
3           note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on op-  
4           eration, procurement, and contracting relating  
5           to foreign-made light detection and ranging  
6           technology; and

7           (E) a covered foreign country (as defined  
8           in section 1622 of the National Defense Au-  
9           thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public  
10          Law 117–81; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421  
11          note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan  
12          to implement certain defense intelligence re-  
13          forms.

14          (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Commu-  
15          nity Annual Threat Assessment, the United States  
16          faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global  
17          landscape as the four adversaries named in para-  
18          graph (1) deepen cooperation in a manner that—

19                 (A) reinforces threats posed by each such  
20                 adversary individually; and

21                 (B) poses new challenges to the strength  
22                 and power of the United States globally.

23          (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in para-  
24          graph (3) is occurring bilaterally, as the People’s  
25          Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran,

1       and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  
2       strengthen diplomatic, economic, and military ties in  
3       accordance with bilateral agreements, which in-  
4       clude—

5               (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation  
6               and Mutual Assistance between China and the  
7               Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed  
8               at Beijing July 11, 1961;

9               (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive  
10              Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Re-  
11              public of Iran and the People’s Republic of  
12              China, issued on March 27, 2021;

13             (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian  
14             Federation and the People’s Republic of China  
15             on International Relations Entering a New Era  
16             and Global Sustainable Development, issued on  
17             February 4, 2022;

18             (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Stra-  
19             tegic Partnership between the Russian Federa-  
20             tion and the Democratic People’s Republic of  
21             Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024;

22             (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Com-  
23             prehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at  
24             Moscow January 17, 2025; and

1 (F) traditional relations of friendship and  
2 cooperation between Iran and the Democratic  
3 People's Republic of Korea.

4 (4) The most concerning forms of such coopera-  
5 tion with respect to the interests of the United  
6 States occur bilaterally in the realm of defense co-  
7 operation. Examples include the following:

8 (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons  
9 and munitions. Since 2022, Iran has supplied  
10 the Russian Federation with drones and bal-  
11 listic missiles, and the Democratic People's Re-  
12 public of Korea has provided artillery ammuni-  
13 tion and ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Rus-  
14 sian Federation has agreed to provide Iran with  
15 Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.

16 (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use  
17 technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods  
18 supplied by the People's Republic of China have  
19 enabled the Russian Federation to continue de-  
20 fense production in the face of wide-ranging  
21 sanctions and export controls intended to pre-  
22 vent the Russian Federation from accessing the  
23 necessary components to fuel its defense indus-  
24 try. In turn, reporting indicates that the Rus-  
25 sian Federation has provided technical expertise

1 on satellite technology to the Democratic Peo-  
2 ple's Republic of Korea and is working closely  
3 with the People's Republic of China on air de-  
4 fense and submarine technology.

5 (C) Joint military activities and exercises.  
6 The military forces of the Democratic People's  
7 Republic of Korea are actively participating in  
8 the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine,  
9 and joint military exercises between the Peo-  
10 ple's Republic of China and the Russian Fed-  
11 eration are expanding in scope, scale, and geo-  
12 graphic reach, including in close proximity to  
13 territory of the United States.

14 (D) Coordination on disinformation and  
15 cyber operations, including coordinated mes-  
16 saging aimed at denigrating and isolating the  
17 United States internationally.

18 (5) Adversaries of the United States are also  
19 cooperating in a manner that may circumvent  
20 United States and multilateral economic tools. Ex-  
21 amples include the following:

22 (A) The continued purchase by the Peo-  
23 ple's Republic of China of oil from Iran despite  
24 sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the  
25 United States on oil from Iran.

1 (B) The veto by the Russian Federation  
2 of, and abstention by the People's Republic of  
3 China in a vote on, a United Nations Security  
4 Council resolution relating to monitoring United  
5 Nations Security Council-levied sanctions on the  
6 Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

7 (6) Adversaries of the United States are cooper-  
8 ating multilaterally in international institutions such  
9 as the United Nations and through expanded multi-  
10 lateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-  
11 China-South Africa group (commonly known as  
12 "BRICS"), to isolate and erode the influence of the  
13 United States.

14 (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment  
15 among the People's Republic of China, the Russian  
16 Federation, Iran, and the Democratic People's Re-  
17 public of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses  
18 a significant threat to United States interests and  
19 national security.

20 (8) Such increasing alignment—

21 (A) allows each such adversary to mod-  
22 ernize its military more quickly than previously  
23 anticipated;

24 (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in  
25 capabilities through the sharing among such ad-

1           versaries of critical military technologies, which  
2           could erode the technological edge of the United  
3           States Armed Forces;

4           (C) presents increasing challenges to strat-  
5           egies of isolation or containment against such  
6           individual adversaries, since the People's Re-  
7           public of China, the Russian Federation, Iran,  
8           and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
9           now provide critical lifelines to each other;

10          (D) threatens the effectiveness of United  
11          States economic tools, as such adversaries co-  
12          operate to evade United States sanctions and  
13          export controls and seek to establish alternative  
14          payment mechanisms that do not require trans-  
15          actions in United States dollars; and

16          (E) increases the chances of United States  
17          conflict or tensions with any one of such adver-  
18          saries drawing in another, thereby posing a  
19          greater risk that the United States will have to  
20          contend with simultaneous threats from such  
21          adversaries in one or more theaters.

22   **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

23       It is the policy of the United States—

24           (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous  
25       aspects of cooperation between and among the Peo-



1 ple's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,  
2 Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of  
3 Korea, including by using the threat of sanctions  
4 and export controls, bringing such cooperation to  
5 light, and sharing information with United States al-  
6 lies and partners who may—

7 (A) share the concerns and objectives of  
8 the United States; and

9 (B) have influence over such adversaries;

10 (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding  
11 its footprint or capabilities across the world; and

12 (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that  
13 the United States could face simultaneous challenges  
14 or conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple  
15 theaters, including by bolstering deterrence across  
16 all priority theaters.

17 **SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.**

18 (a) **TASK FORCES ON ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT.**—

19 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 60 days after  
20 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
21 of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of  
22 the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Direc-  
23 tor of National Intelligence, and the Director of the  
24 Central Intelligence Agency shall each—

1 (A) establish a task force on adversary  
2 alignment; and

3 (B) designate a point of contact on adver-  
4 sary alignment, who shall serve as the head of  
5 the task force for the applicable department, of-  
6 fice, or agency.

7 (2) REQUIREMENTS.—Each task force estab-  
8 lished pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—

9 (A) comprise—

10 (i) subject matter experts covering  
11 each of—

12 (I) the People's Republic of  
13 China;

14 (II) the Russian Federation;

15 (III) Iran; and

16 (IV) the Democratic People's Re-  
17 public of Korea;

18 (ii) representatives covering all core  
19 functions of the department, office, or  
20 agency of the Secretary or Director estab-  
21 lishing the task force; and

22 (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and  
23 senior management;

24 (B) ensure that the task force members  
25 have the requisite security clearances and ac-

1           cess to critical compartmented information  
2           streams necessary to assess and understand the  
3           full scope of adversary cooperation, including  
4           how events in one theater might trigger actions  
5           in another; and

6           (C) not later than 180 days after the date  
7           of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Sec-  
8           retary or Director who established the task  
9           force, and to the appropriate committees of  
10          Congress, a report—

11                 (i) evaluating the impact of adversary  
12                 alignment on the relevant operations car-  
13                 ried out by the individual department, of-  
14                 fice, or agency of the task force; and

15                 (ii) putting forth recommendations for  
16                 such organizational changes as the task  
17                 force considers necessary to ensure the de-  
18                 partment, office, or agency of the task  
19                 force is well positioned to routinely evalu-  
20                 ate and respond to the rapidly evolving na-  
21                 ture of adversary cooperation and the at-  
22                 tendant risks.

23           (3) QUARTERLY INTERAGENCY MEETING.—Not  
24           less frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task  
25           forces established under this section shall meet to

1 discuss findings, problems, and next steps with re-  
2 spect to adversary alignment.

3 (b) REPORT ON NATURE, TRAJECTORY, AND RISKS  
4 OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN, AND MULTILAT-  
5 ERAL COOPERATION AMONG, ADVERSARIES OF THE  
6 UNITED STATES.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after  
8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director  
9 of National Intelligence, in coordination with the  
10 head of any Federal agency the Director considers  
11 appropriate, shall submit to the President, any Fed-  
12 eral officer of Cabinet-level rank the Director con-  
13 sidered appropriate, and the appropriate committees  
14 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral  
15 cooperation among adversaries of the United States  
16 and the resulting risks of such cooperation.

17 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-  
18 graph (1) shall include the following:

19 (A) A description of the current nature  
20 and extent of bilateral or multilateral coopera-  
21 tion among the People's Republic of China, the  
22 Russian Federation, Iran, and the Democratic  
23 People's Republic of Korea across the diplo-  
24 matic, information, military, and economic  
25 spheres, and an assessment of the advantages

1           that accrue to each such adversary from such  
2           cooperation.

3           (B) An assessment of the trajectory for co-  
4           operation among the adversaries described in  
5           subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period be-  
6           ginning on the date on which the report is sub-  
7           mitted.

8           (C) An outline of the risks to the United  
9           States and allied diplomatic, military, intel-  
10          ligence, and economic operations, and broader  
11          security interests around the world, including  
12          the following:

13               (i) The risk of technology transfer  
14               dramatically increasing the military capa-  
15               bilities of adversaries of the United States  
16               and its impact on the relative balance of  
17               United States and allied capabilities as  
18               compared to that of the adversary.

19               (ii) The risk posed to the United  
20               States by efforts made by adversaries to  
21               establish alternate payment systems, in  
22               particular with respect to the dominance of  
23               the United States dollar and the effective-  
24               ness of United States sanctions and export  
25               control tools.

1 (iii) The risk that an adversary of the  
2 United States might assist or otherwise en-  
3 able another adversary of the United  
4 States in the event that one or more adver-  
5 saries become party to a conflict with the  
6 United States.

7 (iv) The risk that adversary coopera-  
8 tion poses a growing threat to United  
9 States intelligence collection efforts.

10 (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities  
11 and tension points within such adversary bilat-  
12 eral or multilateral relationships, and an assess-  
13 ment of the likely effect of efforts by the United  
14 States to separate adversaries.

15 (3) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to  
16 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

17 (c) REPORT ON STRATEGIC APPROACH.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
20 retary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in con-  
21 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the  
22 Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National In-  
23 telligence, and the Director of the Central Intel-  
24 ligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate com-  
25 mittees of Congress a report outlining the strategic

1 approach of the United States to adversary align-  
2 ment and the necessary steps to disrupt, frustrate,  
3 constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation  
4 during the two-year period beginning on the date of  
5 the enactment of this Act.

6 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-  
7 graph (1) shall include the following:

8 (A) A detailed description of the methods  
9 and tools available to the United States to dis-  
10 rupt the most dangerous elements of adversary  
11 cooperation, including the growing connectivity  
12 between the defense industrial bases of each ad-  
13 versary.

14 (B) A timeline for using diplomatic en-  
15 gagement and intelligence diplomacy—

16 (i) to educate allies and partners  
17 about the increasing risk of adversary  
18 alignment; and

19 (ii) to secure the support of allies and  
20 partners in combating adversary align-  
21 ment.

22 (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of  
23 United States methods of economic statecraft,  
24 including an assessment of the efficiency of the  
25 United States sanctions and export control en-

forcement apparatus and any accompanying resourcing requirements.

(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the Middle East by—

(i) increasing United States and allied munitions stockpiles, particularly such stockpiles that are most critical for supporting frontline partners such as Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression by a United States adversary;

(ii) facilitating collaborative efforts with allies for the co-production, co-maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical munitions and platforms required by the United States and allies and partners of the United States in the event of a future conflict with the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and

(iii) more effectively using funding through the United States Foreign Military Financing program to support allied and partner domestic defense production



1                   that can contribute to deterrence in each  
2                   such priority theater.

3                   (E) A plan for digitizing and updating  
4                   war-planning tools of the Department of De-  
5                   fense not later than 1 year after the date on  
6                   which the report is submitted to ensure that  
7                   United States war planners are better equipped  
8                   to update and modify war plans in the face of  
9                   rapidly evolving information on adversary co-  
10                  operation.

11                  (F) An assessment of the capability gaps  
12                  and vulnerabilities the United States would face  
13                  in deterring an adversary in the event that the  
14                  United States is engaged in a conflict with an-  
15                  other adversary, and a plan to work with allies  
16                  and partners to address such gaps and  
17                  vulnerabilities.

18                  (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph  
19                  (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

20                  (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-  
21                  FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-  
22                  tees of Congress” means—

23                         (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Se-  
24                         lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on  
25                         Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropria-

1        tions, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
2        Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce,  
3        Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and  
4        (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Per-  
5        manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-  
6        mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appro-  
7        priations, the Committee on Financial Services, and  
8        the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the  
9        House of Representatives.