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November 10, 2026

The Honorable Howard Lutnick
Secretary of Commerce
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20230

The Honorable Todd Blanche
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable Jay Clayton
Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
1500 Tysons McLean Drive
McLean, VA 22102

Secretary Lutnick, Attorney General Blanche, Secretary Rubio, and Director Clayton:

I request an update on the U.S. government's investigation into the Singapore-based firm Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. ("Megaspeed") for potentially circumventing U.S. export controls and exploiting gray areas in the U.S. export control regime to divert advanced American semiconductor capabilities to China, including advanced Nvidia semiconductors. The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initially led this investigation, but *New York Times* reporting indicates that the Department of Justice is now leading this effort.[1] Additionally, I request that you engage countries hosting Megaspeed infrastructure – such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia – to address potential violations of U.S. export controls. I also request your consideration of specific punitive measures against Megaspeed, as well as stronger approaches to export controls and enforcement.

These efforts are crucial and time-sensitive given *New York Times* reporting that the U.S. intelligence community found Megaspeed executive Alice Huang to be a Chinese intelligence asset who passed critical information to the Chinese government.[2] Ensuring the integrity of our export controls is central to advancing America's national security and our long-term economic prosperity, including by preventing China – our only near-peer competitor – from obtaining advanced U.S. technologies with military applications, such as cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) chips. Our export control regime must be able to identify and curtail entities actively seeking to evade those controls.

Extensive public reporting suggests that Megaspeed acts as a high-volume conduit for China-bound transfers of advanced American technology through the following activities:

- **Intelligence Operations:** According to *The New York Times*, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that a top executive at Megaspeed, Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), acted as a Chinese intelligence asset to gather information for Beijing.[3] Per this report, electronic surveillance revealed that Ms. Huang cultivated a close relationship with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The report also

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html

indicated that Ms. Huang likely funneled information not only about Nvidia to the Chinese government, but also about President Trump's plans and intentions.[4] The report indicates that Megaspeed continues to trumpet its close connections to Nvidia.[5]

- **Exploitation of Sanctioned Intermediaries:** Reports indicate that Megaspeed operated as a middle man, using Aivres – a U.S.-registered subsidiary of Chinese technology giant Inspur, on which the United States imposed sanctions for supporting China's military – to source restricted hardware, such as advanced Nvidia AI chips.[6] Aivres was able to purchase this hardware (1) because Aivres was not subject to the sanctions imposed on its parent company Inspur; (2) because the Department of Commerce has rolled back steps that restrict the subsidiaries of Chinese-headquartered firms from buying export-controlled AI chips from U.S. firms; and (3) because the Department of Commerce halted enforcement of licensing requirements for Chinese-headquartered subsidiaries in Malaysia from May 2025, creating more loopholes that have enabled the illicit diversion of sensitive U.S. technology.[7] Aivres thus continued purchasing advanced Nvidia chips, which a Malaysia-based Megaspeed subsidiary then bought.[8] BIS officials who visited Megaspeed's Malaysia data center suspected that Megaspeed may have sent some of these chips to China.[9] Meanwhile, Aivres currently advertises access to Nvidia's most advanced and recently released Vera Rubin chips.[10]

- **Physical Smuggling and Diversion:** Reports indicate that since 2023, Megaspeed's Malaysian and Indonesian subsidiaries have purchased advanced Nvidia chips worth at least $4.6 billion, including the advanced Blackwell processors that the United States has not approved for export to China.[11] A late 2024 BIS inspection of a Megaspeed site in Malaysia discovered advanced hardware in boxes rather than installed and in use, an unusual practice that BIS officials considered a potential indicator of diversion to China.[12]

- **Backdoor Remote Access:** Reports indicate that Megaspeed operates AI data centers in Southeast Asia, potentially with Nvidia Blackwell processors, and may have used them to provide Chinese clients with remote cloud computing power from restricted U.S. hardware.[13] As of October 29, 2026, Nvidia continued to list Megaspeed on its website as a cloud partner.[14] This highlights another gap in current U.S. export control regulations, since the administration has not imposed restrictions to prevent companies headquartered in countries outside of China, like Megaspeed, from providing Chinese clients remote access to export-controlled chips.[15]

- **Opaque Ownership:** Reports indicate that Megaspeed is a spin-off of 7ROAD, a Chinese firm with state-backed ties – raising concerns of corporate restructuring obscuring Beijing's control in order to evade U.S. oversight.[16] Recent probes underscore the severity of these allegations. The Singapore

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html
[7] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/31/us-takes-step-to-halt-nvidia-ai-chip-shipments-to-chinese-firms-outside-china.html
[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html
[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html
[10] https://aivres.com/, accessed November 6, 2026
[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-12-22/nvidia-partner-megaspeed-draws-china-chip-smuggling-concerns-in-us
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html
[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html; https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/10/singapore-us-investigate-nvidia-client-megaspeed-export-controls-violation.html
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html; https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/10/singapore-us-investigate-nvidia-client-megaspeed-export-controls-violation.html
[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html

Police Force has investigated Megaspeed for potential legal violations.[17] Major infrastructure partners like Bridge Data Centres, backed by Bain Capital, have terminated their ties with Megaspeed.[18] That Megaspeed reportedly ceased new orders amid these probes raises serious questions warranting an American response.[19] These facts raise serious concerns about Chinese companies using opaque corporate structures to circumvent U.S. export controls.

This flow of advanced AI chips to China and China's access to restricted cloud computing capabilities risk enabling Beijing's development of autonomous weapon systems, advanced cyber-warfare capabilities, and more powerful surveillance tools – which could eventually pose significant challenges to U.S. capabilities. China's military could one day use these technologies against American servicemembers. Large-scale diversion also creates a gray market that penalizes law-abiding companies and devalues the intellectual property that sustains U.S. global economic leadership.

Accordingly, I respectfully request that you provide the following information to my office in writing by November 24, 2026:

1. An update on the Department of Justice's continuation of the Department of Commerce investigation into Megaspeed;
2. A detailed description of any Department of Commerce efforts to prevent Megaspeed, whose top executive is reportedly a Chinese intelligence asset, from purchasing Nvidia chips, such as by sending an "Is Informed" letter to Nvidia blocking certain semiconductor shipments to Megaspeed and potentially placing Megaspeed on the Entity List;
3. A detailed accounting of:
    a. The Department of Commerce and Department of State's efforts to coordinate a rigorous response with partners including Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia;
    b. The Department of Commerce's efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow Chinese companies to access restricted U.S. technology, such as semiconductors and cloud computing, through Southeast Asia; and
    c. The Department of Commerce's efforts to close loopholes in U.S. export controls that allow subsidiaries of China-headquartered firms, including those on whom the United States has already imposed sanctions, to buy export-controlled AI chips in the United States.
4. A detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community's analysis of Alice Huang's reported service as a Chinese intelligence asset and the broader threat Megaspeed poses to U.S. national security; and
5. A detailed explanation of the Intelligence Community's sharing of such information, on Ms. Huang and Megaspeed, with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the White House.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,



Michael F. Bennet
United States Senator

[17] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/10/singapore-us-investigate-nvidia-client-megaspeed-export-controls-violation.html
[18] https://finance.yahoo.com/sectors/technology/articles/bain-capitals-data-center-unit-144754276.html
[19] https://www.straitstimes.com/business/megaspeed-singapore-firm-at-centre-of-us-chip-probe-goes-dark